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STEIN v. NEW YORK
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUBMITTING TO JURY
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION WHEN THERE
IS OTHER EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
Stein v. People of the State of New York'
At the consolidated trial of the three petitioners for
felonious murder, the confessions of two, made while con-
fined apart from each other, were admitted in evidence
over objection, along with testimony of the police as to
their voluntary character, and of the police doctor as to
signs of violence possibly inflicted on each petitioner after
arrest. There was also ample other testimony adduced
upon which the jury could convict. After instruction from
the trial court to consider the confessions in determining
guilt only if found beyond a reasonable doubt to have been
given without coercion, the jury returned a general ver-
dict of guilty as to each petitioner. The intermediate and
highest state appellate courts affirmed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari because of the important due pro-
cess questions involved.' The Supreme Court held, inter
alia, in a 6-3 decision, Justice Jackson speaking for the
majority, that, where the trial court upon conflicting evi-
dence as to voluntariness, admitted the confessions before
the jury with an instruction to consider them in determin-
ing guilt only if found beyond a reasonable doubt to have
been given without coercion, and there was sufficient evi-
dence apart from the confessions to sustain the convictions,
such procedure and the convictions thereon by general ver-
dict were not unconstitutional.'
The essence of the petitioners' contention was that upon
admission of the confessions the jury should have been in-
structed to acquit, regardless of other evidence adduced, if
the confessions were found to have been coerced4 - not an
unreasonable claim in the light of the obvious prejudicial
effect of an admission by a defendant of his guilt on a jury,
and in the light of the Court's holding in setting aside the
conviction in Malinski v. New York' some years earlier,
when it held that there was a denial of due process in the
submission of a coerced confession to a jury, even though
1346 U. S. 156 (1953).
2 Petitioners in instant case argued several constitutional objections, but
this casenote is concerned' with only one of their contentions and the Court's
holding thereon. Another facet of 'the decision is discussed in a companion
casenote following this.
3 This holding is not found in any one statement of the Court but is de-
rived from several interrelated statements in the opinion.
'Supra, n. 1, 188.
'324 U. S. 401 (1945).
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there was ample other evidence to convict.6 The Malinski
doctrine had been repeated in Haley v. Ohio,7 Gallegos v.
Nebraska,' Stroble v. California,9 and Brown v. Allen,"°
and a similar statement had been made in Lyons v. Okla-
homa," decided prior to the Malinski decision although not
relied on therein.
Petitioners here attacked the constitutionality of a pro-
cedure for determining the admissibility of confessions
which Wigmore considered highly improper but admitted
had been adopted by a number of federal courts and some
thirty state courts, 2 including Maryland.'8 This widespread
practice, as followed in the instant case, was merely to in-
struct the jury not to consider the confessions in determin-
ing guilt if not found beyond a reasonable doubt to have
been given voluntarily. Under such an instruction, the
jury, in rendering its general verdict, could have rested its
conclusion on a finding that the confessions had been volun-
tarily given and supported the conclusion of guilt, or it
could have found them to have been coerced and still have
convicted on the other evidence. Leaving this alternative
to the jury according to petitioners, was unconstitutional.
Statements that petitioners' claim was "far-reaching"
and "novel"' 4 form part of the Court's reasoning that it had
never before been squarely faced with this precise problem
and all of its ramifications. In the Malinski case and the
decisions repeating its doctrine the convicted defendants
had not attacked the constitutionality of the procedure for
the ultimate determination of whether a confession should
be considered as to guilt by the jury, where there was a
dispute of fact as to its voluntary character, but the con-
stitutionality of the admission of confessions, which such
defendants contended were on the undisputed facts coerced.
Here the petitioners argued not only that the confessions
were on the undisputed evidence coerced but that the very
procedure of submitting confessions to the jury without an
instruction to acquit if found coerced denied due process.
0 Ibid, 404.
7 332 U. S. 596, 599 (1948).8 342 U. S. 55, 63 (1951).
9 343 U. S. 181, 190 (1952).
'°344 U. S. 443, 475 (1953).
"322 U. S. 596, 597 (n. 1) (1944).
12WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940), Sec. 861, where the author states
the rule that the question of admissibility of evidence, including confessions,
should always be for the court to decide, and continues: "Nevertheless, many
Courts today hold that, after the judge has applied the rules and admitted
the confession, the jury are to apply them again, and by that test may re-
ject it." Also see note 3 to that section and the jurisdictions therein men-
tioned as having adopted such procedure.
Is Smith v. State, 56 A. 2d 818, 189 Md. 596, 603-604 (1948).
u4 Stein v. People of State of New York, 346 U. S. 156, 188-189 (1953).
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In determining the constitutionality of this procedure
here challenged the Court recognized the disadvantages to
both the Court and the petitioners in not being able to
discover from the general verdict whether the jury con-
sidered or rejected the confession in convicting," but de-
cided that a procedure "so long established and widely
approved by state judiciaries" should not be considered a
violation of due process.'" To arrive at this decision the
Court considered the constitutional effect of the alterna-
tives left to the jury by the instruction under this pro-
cedure. 7
The first alternative was to find the confessions volun-
tarily given and upon them base convictions. Upon the
record in the instant case the court perceived no constitu-
tional error if the jury found the confessions to have been
given voluntarily and based upon that finding a verdict of
guilty. 8 And the Court found no constitutional error in the
jury's other alternative which was to reject the confessions
and convict on the other evidence. 9
In the Malinski case in reversing a conviction, rendered
under the same procedure here attacked, because one of
the confessions in effect before the jury, though not form-
ally admitted, was found from the undisputed evidence to
have been coerced, the court's opinion, in which only three
justices joined, one other concurring, stated: "And if it is
introduced at the trial, the judgment of conviction will be
set aside even though the evidence apart from the confes-
sion might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's ver-
dict."2 ° However, in the instant case, as mentioned above,
the court found insufficient evidence of coercion in the un-
disputed facts to make the admission of the confessions un-
constitutional. Accordingly, the petitioners pressed a more
extensive question than existed in the Malinski case,
namely, the constitutionality of the traditional procedure
for determining the admissibility of confessions. The prac-
tice of leaving the ultimate question of admissibility of
confessions to the jury was adopted by a great number of
jurisdictions as a further protection of defendants against
the use of coerced confessions. The upholding of the peti-
25 Ibid, 177.
"Ibid, 179.
17 Ibid.
I8 Ibid, 179-188. In making this finding, the Court reviewed carefully its
prior holdings and present doctrines excluding confessions if obtained either
by physical violence or psychological coercion. The discussion as applied
to the facts, while of no significance on the problems discussed in this case-
note, is of real Import to the practitioner as to the sufficiency of proof of
coercion in any given case.
Ibid, 190.
324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945).
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tioners' contention would require an acquittal from thejury whenever an admitted confession was found coerced,
a serious matter since further prosecution would then be
precluded as double jeopardy.2 Of such a proposition the
Court said: "This Court never has decided that reception
of a confession into evidence, even if we held it to be
coerced, requires an acquittal or discharge of a defen-
dant."22 The necessity of acquittal upon finding a confes-
sion coerced would make the traditional procedure and the
protection it was designed to afford impracticable.28 There-
fore, the refusal to instruct the jury to acquit if the confes-
sions were not voluntarily given was not constitutional
error. 4 The Malinski holding and its subsequent reitera-
tions were not binding, since its consequences, as brought
to light in the instant case, "were not asserted or argued
at the bar nor anticipated or approved" by any statement
in those opinions.2 5
The Fourteenth Amendment, according to the Court,
did not enact "a rigid exclusionary rule of evidence" but
"a guarantee against conviction on inherently untrust-
worthy evidence".26 It should not be the basis of setting
aside a conviction if the admitted confession was untrust-
worthy but there was ample other trustworthy evidence to
sustain a conviction.
It should be noted that the Court distinguished from
this case and confirmed its earlier holdings that it would
be unconstitutional to convict where coerced confessions
were allowed to go to the jury along with other testimony
insufficient to convict,27 and also where the court had de-
cided finally the admissibility of any confession and sub-
mitted it to the jury to be considered as to guilt when in
fact under Supreme Court definition it was coerced.28
The vigorous dissents of Justices Frankfurter, Black and
Douglas argued the conclusive effect of the Malinski doc-
trine and considered the majority's ruling as opening the
door to more extensive use of the third degree by police
authorities.2" Justice Douglas in addition contended that
the violation of a constitutional guarantee was not a mere
harmless error in the proceeding, which, if not affecting
17Supra, n. 14.
2 Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid, 193.
Ibid, 189.
Ibid, 192.
Ibid, 189-190.
Ibid, 191-192.
2Ibid, 197-199 (Justice Black's dissent), 199-203 (Justice Frankfurter's
dissent), 203-206 (Justice Douglas's dissent).
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substantial rights, might be disregarded, but of such preju-
dice as always to amount to a denial of due process, 0 and
concluded with a note that the decision here would have
been otherwise if the constitutional school of thought pre-
vailing in the late forties were still dominant."'
As to any change of constitutional school of thought it
should be noted that in two very recent cases, one decided
in 1952 and the other in early 1953, with the same member-
ship as here the Court, speaking through justices who
found with the majority here, repeated and sustained the
Malinski doctrine.2 But here the Malinski doctrine ap-
peared in a new light, and the majority of the Court, per-
ceiving its evil effect on a traditional procedure, cast it
aside in favor of sustaining the constitutionality of that
procedure.
RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE CONFRONTED WITH
HIS ACCUSERS NOT GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Stein v. People of the State of New York'
In the same case as noted in the preceding casenote,
upon objection of the petitioner who did not confess that
the admission of the confessions of his co-defendants im-
plicating him in the crime denied him his constitutional
right to be confronted with his accusers as guaranteed by
the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the sharply divided Court,2 held: that there was no con-
stitutional right in state criminal proceedings under the
Fourteenth Amendment to be confronted with one's ac-
cusers and to be allowed to cross examine them.8
Petitioner's basic contention was that there was a fed-
eral right of confrontation in state criminal proceedings.
The Court met this contention with West v. Louisiana,4
where in dicta the Court had clearly stated that the right
of confrontation, granted in Federal criminal proceedings
8
'Ibid, 204.
S Ibid, 208, note *.
Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 (1952) ; Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S.
443 (1953).
'346 U. S. 156 (1953). This is a companion casenote to the preceding one
and, since arising out of the same case, the facts set out in the previous
casenote apply here.
As pointed out in the prior note, circa, footnote 29, this was a 6-3 de-
cision, Justice Jackson for the Court, with Justices Frankfurter, Black, and
Douglas in dissent. However, the only dissent to specifically mention the
point here involved was that of Justice Black, 197.8 Supra, n. 1, 195.
'194 U. S. 258 (1904).
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